ABSTRACT: The use of agency theory remains highly controversial among business ethicists. While some regard it as an essential tool for analyzing and understanding the recent spate of corporate ethics scandals, others argue that these scandals might not even have occurred had it not been for the widespread teaching of agency theory in business schools. This paper presents a qualifi ed defense of agency theory against these charges, fi rst by identifying the theoretical commitments that are essential to the theory (in order to distinguish between agency theory itself and certain incorrect interpretations that have been widely promulgated), and second, by specifying more clearly the different ways that agency theory can be used to analyze relations within the fi rm. The recommendation that follows from this analysis is that agency theory be used as a critical-diagnostic tool, to identify the points at which both fi rms and markets will be vulnerable to breakdown in the absence of moral constraint.
to the most egregious transactions. It seems plausible to suppose that this illegal conduct was surrounded by a fairly broad penumbral region of unethical conduct.
One of the central tasks of theoretical business ethics is to provide a conceptual framework that will allow us to articulate more clearly the intuitive sense we all have that "nest-feathering" and similar forms of conduct are unethical, so that we can state with greater precision the nature of the moral obligations that have been violated. In approaching this task, the fi rst place that business ethicists might reasonably be expected to look is to agency theory. 1 After all, the relationship between owners and managers is a textbook example of a principal-agent relationship (e.g., Campbell 1995: 79-86; Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 170) . Furthermore, deception and misappropriation of funds by the agent represent perfect examples of the type of moral hazard problems that are an endemic feature of principal-agent relations. Thus one might expect business ethicists to embrace agency vocabulary as a way of stating with greater precision the exact nature of the moral obligations that were violated at Hollinger, Enron and elsewhere. 2 One might also expect business ethicists to insist that greater attention be paid to agency relations, and to the potential moral hazard problems that they harbor, as a way of avoiding such scandals in the future. Indeed, many have done so.
However, the reaction to the scandals among business ethicists has been far more mixed than one might expect. Part of the reason is that many business ethicists have spent considerable time and energy downplaying the importance of shareholders in the organizational structure of the fi rm, and trying to show that managers have important moral obligations to other "stakeholder" groups (see Blair, 1995; Clarkson, 1998; Kelly, 2001) . Many deny that managers should be regarded as "agents" of the shareholders in any signifi cant sense of the term. Thus they do not regard the recent spate of corporate scandals as grounds for renewed attention to the agency risks that exist in the manager-shareholder relation. On the contrary, some have gone so far as to blame agency theory-and the teaching of agency theory in business schools-for creating the corporate culture that led directly to the scandals (Ghoshal 2005: 75-76) . Rakesh Khurana, Nitin Nohria, and Daniel Penrice of the Harvard Business School have suggested that the "doctrine of shareholder primacy" combined with agency theory "led directly to many of the worst profi t-maximizing abuses unmasked in the recent wave of corporate scandals" (2005) . 3 Along similar lines, Brian Kulik (2005) has argued that "agency reasoning" on the part of Enron executives led to the creation of an "agency culture" and an organizational structure within the fi rm that encouraged corrupt behavior.
So which is it? Is agency theory a part of the problem, or a part of the solution? In order to get clear on this question, it is important fi rst to get clear on the sort of theoretical commitments that are essential to agency theory (in order to distinguish between agency theory itself and certain incorrect interpretations that have become widely promulgated). It is also important to be more specifi c about the ways that agency theory can be used to analyze relations within the fi rm, in order to determine whether it is the use or the abuse of agency theory that has become a source of mischief. Finally, it is important to be more specifi c about the circumstances in which moral obligations can arise out of agency relations. Only then is it possible to develop a more balanced appreciation of the contribution that agency theory can make to the study of business ethics. Thus I will begin with an outline of three major objections that have been raised against the use of agency theory by business ethicists. In the second section, I show how some-but not all-of these objections can be met, before going on, in the fi nal section, to present what I consider to be the most fruitful use of agency theory. Taking agency theory seriously, I will argue, provides the closest thing one can get to a proof that, without certain forms of moral constraint, it would be impossible to organize a successful business fi rm, much less have a productive market economy. Thus agency theory should be embraced by business ethicists, not because it promotes an empirically accurate understanding of the fi rm-it does not-but because it shows how unworkable modern capitalism would be in the absence of any sort of business ethics.
OBJECTIONS TO AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory, in the sense that the term is used here, is an approach that involves the application of game theory to the analysis of a particular class of interactions, viz., "situations in which one individual (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal) and is supposed to advance the principal's goals" (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 170) . This is already a potential source of confusion, since the term "agent" is used differently here than in certain other contexts, such as commercial law, where the "law of agency" assigns a much narrower meaning to the term (see Clark, 1985: 56) . In the legal sense, an agent is one who is entitled to negotiate on behalf of a principal, or bring the principal into a contractual relation with some third party. It is in this sense of the term that we talk about "real estate agents" or "literary agents." The game-theoretic sense is much broader, dealing (at least in principle) with any sort of interaction between two individuals where one is trying to infl uence the actions of the other. Indeed, perhaps because of the potential for confusion on this score, some agency theorists have taken to redescribing their work as simply "the theory of incentives" (e.g., Campbell, 1995, Laffont and Martimort, 2002 ).
Yet while disputes over the use of the term "agent" have given rise to considerable misunderstanding, it is the use of game theory (or "rational choice theory") that makes agency theory genuinely controversial. This is because game theory comes freighted with a number of substantive theoretical assumptions, including most prominently, a commitment to an instrumental (or "economic") model of rational action. Thus individuals are represented as expected utility-maximizers (who, when faced with a problem of interdependent choice, select actions that represent an individually best response to the anticipated actions of the other individuals). This immediately raises the dander of many ethicists, since economic models of rationality are famous for either classifying all moral action as irrational, or else rationalizing it through the 'discovery' and ascription of some underlying nonmoral incentive. Unsurprisingly, this forms the basis for the most widespread and immediate objection to agency theory:
Self-Interest
Ethicists often complain that agency theorists, by adopting an economic model of action, thereby assume that rational individuals are self-interested, or that they act only from egoistic and not altruistic motives. This is, from their point of view, equivalent to endorsing moral skepticism, and is therefore not a helpful point of departure for the development of a system of applied ethics. Of course, the standard response to this criticism is to say that the economic model of rationality implies no such thing. Utility is defi ned with respect to the preferences of individuals, and preferences refl ect whatever desires individuals happen to have, egoistic or altruistic. 4 David Gauthier made the point most succinctly, when he observed that, according to the economic model of rationality, "it is not the interests in the self, that take oneself as object, but interests of the self, held by oneself as subject, that provide the basis for rational choice and action" (1986: 7; see also Hausman & McPherson, 1996: 52-53) . Thus what creates the need for incentives in principal-agent relations, strictly speaking, is not the fact that the principal and the agent have egoistic preferences, but merely the fact that they have different preferences. Principal-agent theory is about how individuals manage situations involving "goal incongruity" between two or more persons (Dees, 1992: 37-38) . It does not matter whether they are selfi sh or not; what matters is that each acts in pursuit of his or her own goals, and that the goals of the other show up only insofar as they affect that agent's goals, or ability to satisfy these goals.
On these grounds, some business ethicists have concluded that agency theory is perfectly harmless. Allan Buchanan articulates this view well when he writes that [i] f, in applying principal/agent theory, it were necessary to assume that motivation is exclusively or primarily self-interested, this would greatly reduce if not vitiate the enterprise. However, we need not do so. Instead, we can proceed on the assumption that the confl icts of interest that give rise to agency-risks may result from a variety of motivations, on the part of agents and principals. All that is necessary is that there be confl icts of interest. (Buchanan 1996: 421) Of course, in fairness to those business ethicists who have complained about the self-interest assumption, it should be noted that one can search the economic "theory of the fi rm" literature for a very long time before fi nding an actual example of an agency analysis that ascribes altruistic motives to any of the parties involved. Even if the theoretical framework does not force them to do so, agency theorists often do make unfl attering empirical assumptions about individual preferences, by stipulating in their models that, for example, work effort has negative utility, money rewards have positive utility, and that individuals have no other relevant motives (Dees, 1992: 29) . Strictly speaking, however, such assumptions are not essential to the economic model of rationality, and so theorists like Buchanan are quite correct to point out that agency theory per se entails no commitment to such claims.
It would be premature, however, to conclude on this basis that the economic conception of rationality is neutral from the standpoint of ethics. There are a number of other substantive theoretical commitments associated with the instrumental model, which are hostile from the perspective of the ethicist, and which cannot be purged from the model so easily.
The fi rst of the two outstanding problems stems directly from the tendency among game theorists to "black box" all questions of motivation. While this theoretical strategy does allow them to sidestep disputes over altruism and egoism, it also leaves them without a developed theory of preference-formation, and thus without any ability to model the way that preference changes arise out of social interactions (Knight, 1992: 18) . Preferences are taken as given, and are also taken to be independent of strategies. Thus players in a standard game-theoretic model cannot change each others' preferences (i.e., utility functions) through their actions. This is closely related to the fact that in standard game-theoretic models players are explicitly precluded from communicating with one another (using any sort of independent semantic resources, such as language; they are still able to draw inferences from observing each others' actions, and so are able to 'communicate' in this sense [Nash, 1951] ). Furthermore, insofar as they are able to communicate with one another, standard game-theoretic solution concepts, like Nash equilibrium, do not apply (Heath, 2001: 73-78) . This non-trivial restriction on game-theoretic models is often conveniently forgotten by those who are eager to apply them to the analysis of empirical interactions.
In any case, the fact that there is no generally accepted or robust theory of endogenous preference-change in games means that agency theorists have devoted almost all of their time and attention to studying the way that external incentives can be used to bring about greater alignment of goals in cases of incongruity. This often turns into a classic case of economists searching whether the light is best. For instance, in their widely used management textbook on organizational theory, game theorists Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992) dedicate an entire chapter to the subject of moral hazard and agency relations within the fi rm. They canvas an exhaustive range of strategies for controlling employee shirking, including monitoring, incentive contracts, performance pay, ownership stakes, employee bonding, and promotional systems. At the same time, they fail to mention such absolutely elementary factors as whether or not employees enjoy their jobs, and whether they love or hate the fi rm that they work for (1992: 179-92) . 5 Similarly, in their chapter on human resources policy, Milgrom and Roberts have a lengthy discussion of employee retention strategies, which does not once mention the fact that employees sometimes feel a sense of loyalty toward the fi rm (and that managers have it within their power to cultivate such loyalties). On occasion, this theory-induced aphasia borders on the comical, as when they develop a "case study" of human resources policies in Japan that manages to avoid mentioning the issue of employee loyalty altogether. "The control structure of Japanese fi rms, which gives considerable power to the employees as a group" is explained, not as a way of promoting loyalty and building esprit de corps, but rather as a way of enabling employees "to protect their valuable employment rights" in the face of labor-market rigidity (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 350) . It is greater fear of losing their jobs, we are led to believe, that makes Japanese workers more willing than Americans to accept sacrifi ces on behalf of their employer (cf. Fukuyama, 1995: 185-93, 255-66) .
Once again though, this emphasis on external incentives is not a necessary consequence of the commitment to the economic conception of rational action. Nothing intrinsic to agency theory prevents theorists from taking an interest in the way that "internal" incentives-e.g., preference change-can be used to overcome agency problems, it is just that game theorists have no idea how to model such processes, and so have largely chosen to ignore them (in very much the same way that, prior to the advent of game theory, economists had no good way to model information states, and so largely chose to ignore the impact of asymmetric information on market exchanges). Thus the emphasis on external incentives is simply a case of methodologically induced bias, which could be corrected through the development of more sophisticated modeling techniques-or even just frank acknowledgment of the need for qualitative analysis in this domain. So again, there is no reason in principle for the ethicist to object to the use of agency theory.
The second outstanding problem, however, has no quick fi x. It involves the commitment, on the part of the agency theorist, to the view that individuals will behave opportunistically whenever given the chance to do so. There are two components of opportunism in the standard (i.e., dictionary) sense of the term: fi rst, that of taking advantage of circumstances as they arise, and second, that of acting without regard for principle. Entering into a cooperative agreement, then reneging once the other party has performed, is the paradigm example. Agency theorists routinely assume that regardless of what people say they are going to do, they will always update their plans as the situation unfolds, and renege on any prior commitments whenever it is in their interest to do so. Thus a farmer may hire workers who promise to harvest his crop, but fi nd himself facing a strike threat at a critical time during the season, when it is too late to bring in replacement workers (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 128 ). An insurance company may agree to indemnify any policy-holder who suffers a particular sort of loss, but then drag its feet when the time comes to pay the claim (e.g., by proposing unusual legal interpretations of certain exclusion clauses). Employees may agree to give some particular job their full attention, but then shirk in various ways in situations where their effort level is unobservable, and so on.
Along with this characterization of opportunistic behavior comes the assumption that individuals are unable to credibly commit themselves to refraining from opportunism, unless they are able to create some external incentive structure that changes their own future incentives (such as posting a bond to guarantee performance). Promises to perform are basically cheap talk, and the rational principal will disregard them when it comes to managing agency relations.
Ethicists are unlikely to regard this as a satisfactory framework for analysis, since it suggests that rationality encourages individuals to exhibit a variety of vices, including fi ckleness (in Machiavelli's sense of the term), dissimulation, treachery and guile. It also follows very closely upon this that rational individuals will treat each other with distrust and suspicion. Thus agency theory seems to take some of the worst assumptions about human nature and build them into its central defi nition of rationality. Furthermore, in this case the standard evasive response is not available to the agency theorist. Unlike the egoism postulate, which is in fact peripheral to the instrumental conception of rationality, the assumption of opportunistic behavior is absolutely central to the model. The fact that agents are unable to make commitments is one of the defi ning postulates of non-cooperative game theory (Nash, 1951) (and again, all of the standard solution concepts do not apply in cases where that assumption is relaxed [Heath, 2001: 86-92] ). What we typically refer to as "opportunistic" behavior is a direct consequence of agents acting in accordance with the general game-theoretic principle known as sequential rationality. This is simply the view that, in a multi-stage game, a rational strategy must not only be utility-maximizing at the point at which it is chosen, but each of its component actions must also be utility-maximizing at the point at which it is to be performed. The sequential rationality postulate is what licenses, among other things, the use of backward induction as a method for solving multi-stage or repeated games (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991: 72-74) , as well as the "subgame perfection" solution concept, which is the most uncontroversial refi nement of Nash equilibrium (Selten, 1975) . It is so deeply entrenched that, in most cases, game theorists don't even bother to mention it. Eric Rasmusen, for example, in his widely used textbook on game theory, discusses the principle only once, in order to explain why he will not be mentioning it again:
The term sequential rationality is used to denote the idea that a player should maximize his payoffs at each point in the game, re-optimizing his decisions at each point and taking into account the fact that he will re-optimize in the future. This is a blend of the economic idea of ignoring sunk costs and rational expectations. Sequential rationality is so standard a criterion for equilibrium now that often I will speak of "equilibrium" without the qualifi er when I wish to refer to an equilibrium that satisfi es sequential rationality. (Rasmusen 1989: 95) "Opportunism," from this perspective, is just a somewhat moralizing way of describing the phenomenon of re-optimization, and as such, is not easy to get rid of as a game-theoretic assumption. On the contrary, it comes very close to capturing the essence of the strategic conception of rationality. Central to this conception is the consequentialism postulate, which states simply that the value of an action is a function of its anticipated consequences, and nothing else (the commitment to re-optimization follows almost immediately from this consequentialism). Yet consequentialism precludes the possibility that a rational agent might incorporate deontic constraints-principles associated directly with actions, independent of their consequences-into his or her deliberations (or what Nozick [1974: 28-32] refers to as "side constraints"). Since genuine loyalty, commitment, conformity to social norms and respect for moral rules are all forms of deontic constraint, this is a very signifi cant restriction. It is what leads game theorists, for instance, to dismiss all "non-payoff relevant" communication as cheap talk. Since individuals will simply say whatever it is in their interest to say (regardless of what honesty might dictate), everyone else, knowing this, will be inclined to ignore them. This generates the well-known game-theoretic result, established by Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, that "once interests diverge by a given, 'fi nite' amount, only no communication is consistent with rational behavior " (1982: 1450) .
Thus when a critic like Eric Noreen claims that "at the heart of agency theory, as expounded in accounting, fi nance and economics, is the assumption that people act unreservedly in their own narrowly defi ned self-interest with, if necessary, guile and deceit " (1988: 359) , he is only partly mistaken. While it is incorrect to say that self-interest, narrowly defi ned, is at the heart of agency theory, it is correct to associate agency theory with the view that people act unreservedly, using guile and deceit-not even when necessary, but whenever it is advantageous for them to do so. Thus the image of employees loafi ng around whenever the boss isn't looking, faking disabilities, calling in sick during hunting or fi shing season, exaggerating the diffi culty of their assignments in order to make their performance appear more impressive, and so on, is a non-accidental consequence of the agency perspective. 6 It is a case of what Lex Donaldson refers to as "guilt by axiom " (1990: 373) .
In a previous iteration of these debates, Oliver Williamson's transaction cost approach to the theory of the fi rm was taken to task for assuming the individuals sometimes behave opportunistically (Ghoshal & Moran 1996: 19) . Agency theory goes much further, claiming that agents, insofar as they are rational, always act opportunistically. Indeed, some of the early victories of agency theory came from its ability to account for cases, such as conglomerate mergers, where managers fail to adopt the fi rm size that would be optimal from the standpoint of transaction-cost minimization (Eisenhardt 1989: 68) . The implicit suggestion was that Williamson was overly optimistic about the possibility of controlling opportunism through the mere substitution of hierarchies for markets. Opportunism was, as far as agency theorists were concerned, more pervasive than even Williamson had realized.
Thus business ethicists do have some legitimate concerns about the agency theory framework, insofar as it incorporates a controversial conception of rationality, one that presupposes the correctness of a certain form of skepticism about moral rules. Yet even then, it is unclear that these concerns need ripen into full-blown complaints. After all, most agency theorists are not in the business of doing normative theory. In other words, they are not telling people how they should behave (and thus are not directly recommending opportunism, guile and deceit as laudable forms of behavior). Their goal typically has been to develop a positive theory of the fi rm, to offer merely empirical explanations of why organizations take on particular forms, structured by particular sets of incentives. If, in doing so, they make certain unfl attering assumptions about human nature, why should that be any cause for alarm? So despite whatever reasonable reservations ethicists may have about the conception of practical rationality underlying agency theory, it remains to be seen how much of a problem that theory can be expected to create for those trying to understand (or promote) business ethics.
2 Shareholder Primacy
A second issue with agency theory that has been a source of concern among ethicists is the close connection many see (and many others assert) between agency theory and the doctrine of shareholder primacy. Margaret Blair, for instance, in her infl uential work on "team production" theory, starts out by defi ning "the principal-agent" model of the fi rm as the view that "public corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who hire directors and offi cers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf " (Blair & Stout, 1999: 248) . Similarly, Milgrom and Roberts, after defi ning the principal-agent relationship, go on to assert that "senior executives of corporations are charged with advancing the interests of the stockholders, who are the owners of the corporation," and that these executives are therefore "agents of the stockholders" (1992: 181). Michael Jensen and William Meckling, after offering a brief introduction to agency theory, argue that "the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fi ts the defi nition of a pure agency relationship" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 309) , and proceed to analyze the fi rm on that basis.
Jensen and Meckling present this as though it were purely an empirical observation-a "positive" claim about the structure of the fi rm, not a "normative" claim about how the fi rm should be organized. Yet it is not clear that describing a particular relationship as a "principal-agent" relationship can ever be normatively neutral. This is because, in any sort of social interaction, both parties infl uence each other to varying degrees. Thus any purely positive defi nition of the agency relationship is bound to create ambiguity concerning who is the agent and who is the principal. Donald Campbell, for instance, in his textbook on incentive theory, states that "the principal is the individual whose welfare is to be served and this welfare is affected by an agent who makes decisions on behalf of the principal" (1995: 8). He then illustrates this with the standard example of a person taking a taxi from the airport, with the passenger as principal and the driver as agent. Yet who is to say that the passenger is the principal, and not the agent? Both individuals make decisions that affect the welfare of the other (e.g., the passenger decides whether to pay, how much to tip, and so on). Recall the old saying that a chicken is nothing but an egg's way of making another egg. In this case, the passenger may be nothing but the cab driver's way of earning a fare. The only way to infer the "correct" agency relationship, using Campbell's defi nition, is to understand the phrases "whose welfare is to be served" and "makes decisions on behalf of " in normative terms. The principal is the one whose welfare ought to be served; and the agent is the one who is under an obligation to serve the principal faithfully (and, typically, is in a position to abuse an information asymmetry).
With Milgrom and Roberts's defi nition, this normative structure is much more apparent. As we saw earlier, they defi ne the agent as the one who is supposed to advance the principal's goals. One can see, however, that with this sort of defi nition, it is not uncontroversial to say that the relationship between managers and shareholders is that of agent to principal (Newton, 1992: 100-01; Blair & Stout, 1999: 252) . Indeed, proponents of normative stakeholder theory would regard it as straightforwardly question-begging to say that the manager is supposed to advance the interests of shareholders, to the exclusion of other constituency groups. Similarly, it is not obvious that employees are agents of their superiors. Workers also depend upon managers to make decisions that will protect their jobs and preserve the value of the fi rm-specifi c human capital that they have accumulated (Blair, 2000: 67) . Or to take a less controversial example, with respect to the management of defi ned-benefi t pension schemes it is quite clear that employees are the principals, with senior managers of the fi rm serving as their agents.
Jensen and Meckling defi ne an agency relationship as "a contract under which one or more persons-the principal(s)-engage another person-the agent-to perform some service on their behalf that involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent" (1976: 308). Yet stakeholder theorists are fond of pointing out that managers have no explicit contract with shareholders, nor do they stand in a fi duciary relationship to them. They have contracts with the firm, and are fi duciaries for the firm (Blair & Stout, 1999: 292) . The relationship between the fi rm and its shareholders is in turn very complicated, making it diffi cult to say that shareholders have "hired" managers, or engaged them "to perform some service on their behalf." The standard response is to say that there is an "implicit" contract in this case (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991: 90-93) , but again, that will be disputed by anyone who does not accept the general thrust of the shareholder primacy doctrine. Typically, the sort of implicit contracts that are posited are simply a consequence of the theory of the fi rm that the person who is doing the inferring happens to subscribe to.
But despite these controversies, none of it adds up to a criticism of agency theory per se. Anyone who tries to map the principal-agent framework onto the relationship between shareholders and management is clearly presupposing the doctrine of shareholder primacy (i.e., the managers ought to serve the interest of shareholders). Thus it would be question-begging to argue that managers should serve the interests of shareholders because they are agents of the shareholders. But a theorist could quite easily employ agency theory as a framework for understanding various relationships within the fi rm without presupposing the doctrine of shareholder primacy. Indeed, one of the central motivations for Blair's team production theory is to bring into sharper focus the problem of managerial opportunism with respect to fi rm-specifi c investments made by non-shareholder groups, such as workers. As the reference to "opportunism" suggests, this analysis has a strong agency-theoretic fl avor. Agency theory provides a very good characterization of many of the problems that have arisen with defi ned-benefi t pension funds (such as moral hazard problems associated with information asymmetries), all based upon the assumption that employees are the relevant principals. Agency theory has also been employed quite usefully in the analysis of cooperatives, in order to understand some of the "costs of ownership" that are incurred when workers, customers or suppliers take over ownership of the fi rm (Hansmann 1992: 35-38) . Thus agency theory in no way presupposes shareholder primacy. Indeed, it is worth recalling that R. Edward Freeman makes liberal use of agency vocabulary in his work on stakeholder theory. He even introduces an "agency principle" in his Doctrine of Fair Contracts, specifying that "any agent must serve the interests of all stakeholders" (1994: 417; 1998: 134) . In his view, the best way to think of stakeholder management is in terms of a set of agency relationships between members of the board of directors and the various constituency groups that have a "stake" in the success of the fi rm. Thus the connection between agency theory and the doctrine of shareholder primacy is not especially close. Many agency theorists are committed to the doctrine of shareholder primacy, but agency theory is not.
Misplaced Loyalty
Another prominent line of objection to agency theory, this time one that condemns both positive and normative uses of the theory, is based upon the claim that agency relationships, even fi duciary relationships, cannot serve as a genuine source of moral obligation. Under the best of circumstances, they serve only to transmit moral obligations from principals to agents. More often, however, agency relationships are used as an excuse for unethical conduct, as agents seek to avoid responsibility by claiming that they are merely "following orders" or "serving the client." From this perspective, agency theory is nothing but a giant distraction, a way of "passing the buck" when it comes to confronting the problem of unethical behavior in business. Either the agent's action is ethical, in which case the agency relationship has nothing to do with it and the source must be traced back to some obligation imposed upon the principal, or it is unethical, and the agency relationship serves only to obscure that fact, by suggesting that it was done out of "loyalty" or "obligation" to the principal. In both cases, the agency relationship has nothing to do with the moral obligations that individuals are subject to, and so business ethicists gain nothing by focusing upon it.
Kenneth Goodpaster has tried to provide a principled basis for this critique, by introducing what he calls the nemo dat principle (1991: 68). The reference is to the Latin term (and legal rule), nemo dat quod non habet, or "nobody gives what he doesn't have." Goodpaster uses this to draw attention to the fact that agency relationships are unable to create moral permissions where previously none existed. Principals cannot (ethically) hire someone to do on their behalf what they could not (ethically) do themselves (1991: 68). In a similar vein, Richard De George takes pains to emphasize that, "acting for another does not give one ethical license," and that "all persons are ethically responsible for their actions, whether performed under command or performed on behalf of another" (1992: 65-66 ). Yet since the agency relationship cannot be a source of moral permissions, it is then claimed, whether or not managers act as agents of shareholders, or of anyone else for that matter, is a question that is simply lacking in moral signifi cance.
This view does have some prima facie plausibility. It is a well-known feature of conventional morality that, say, promising to help a friend commit a crime does not generate a moral obligation on one's part to commit that crime. To allow this would be to permit the unlimited "laundering" of unethical acts into ethical ones. Yet many people seem to believe that professional roles do permit laundering of this sort. Thus, for example, what might ordinarily be regarded as lying is sometimes presented, not just as permissible, but as morally obligatory, when done by a lawyer who is seeking to advance the interests of a client. Arthur Applbaum draws out the absurd consequences of such a view of role obligations by developing a profi le of Sanson, the "executioner of Paris," who carried out his duties with consummate professionalism throughout the fi nal years of the ancien régime, the French Revolution, the Terror and the Thermidor (Applbaum 1999: 16-27 ). Sanson remained above the fray throughout, insisting that he was merely a loyal agent, carrying out legal executions, and was thus not to be held responsible for any of the excesses committed by one or another of the various principals he had served.
More generally, Applbaum develops a thought-experiment involving two societies, Badland and Roland. Badland is essentially a Hobbesian state of nature, in which each individual pursues his or her self-interest in a purely instrumental fashion, and thus "no one avoids harming another unless there are penalties discouraging such harm, and all craftily engage in manipulation and deception if doing so will advance their ends" (Applbaum, 1999: 7) . In Roland, by contrast, "people have the same motivations, but do not pursue their own interests. Rather, each appoints a trustee who pledges to advance the trustor's interests through a blind trust, and each trustor is also a trustee." As a result, in Roland "exactly the same confl icts are fought, the same manipulations occur, the same harms infl icted, but each actor is acting as a faithful professional in fulfi llment of obligations to a client" (Applbaum, 1999: 8) . In what sense, Applbaum then asks, is Roland any better than Badland?
Many business ethicists have seen the relationship between managers and shareholders as essentially equivalent to the relationship between trustees and trustors in Roland. Rather than denying that managers are agents of shareholders (as stakeholder theorists are inclined to do), they simply deny that any such relationship can be a source of moral obligation. Alex Michalos, for instance, in his critique of "the loyal agent's argument," attributes the following view to theorists (like Milton Friedman) who view the obligation of managers toward shareholders as paramount: "As a loyal agent of some principal, I ought to serve his interests as he would serve them himself. . . . He would serve his own interests in a thoroughly egoistic way. Therefore, as a loyal agent of this principal, I ought to operate in a thoroughly egoistic way on his behalf " (1995: 45 [format altered]). Michalos goes on to criticize this argument, claiming that it adds up to little more than an attempt to "launder" egoism into altruism. More polemically, Lisa Newton has argued that, from the perspective of agency theory, "the entirety of corporate enterprise seems . . . to be dedicated to the enrichment of the rich, to satisfy the greed of the truly greedy" (1992: 100). Furthermore, "it follows for agency theory that there can be no such thing as corporate responsibility for community welfare, for the community fi gures nowhere in the principal-agent relationships" (Newton, 1992: 101) . Thus she refers to the moral framework encouraged by agency analysis as "theory-compelled irresponsibility."
There is, however, some danger of equivocation in the way that this argument is formulated. With respect to agents, it is important to distinguish the deontic modality of permission from that of obligation. Critics of the agency perspective are perfectly correct in noting that agency relations cannot create permissions. This is in fact why theorists who are heavily infl uenced by the agency perspective, such as Buchanan, are at pains to specify that the moral obligation of managers is to advance the legitimate interests of shareholders (not just any old interests) (Buchanan, 1996: 422-23 ; see also Quinn & Jones, 1995: 35-36) . Even Friedman qualifi es his defense of profi t-maximization with the stipulation that shareholders will "generally" want "to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom" (1970) .
Thus no one is committing the elementary error of believing that agency relations can turn impermissible conduct into permissible conduct (or wrong into right).
What critics of the agency perspective generally fail to note is that agency relations can serve as a genuine source of moral obligation in one important sense-agency relations can transform actions that are merely permissible for the principal into ones that are obligatory for the agent. This is in fact Applbaum's fi nal observation in Ethics for Adversaries. In response to the (rhetorical) question, "Why take professional roles seriously, from the moral point of view?" he replies: "Though roles ordinarily cannot permit what is forbidden, they can require what is permitted" (Applbaum, 1999: 259) . For example, a person who is accused of a crime, even though he may have done it, is not obliged to plead guilty, but rather is permitted to mount a defense (legally of course, but perhaps also morally, in cases where the prosecution is seeking an unreasonably harsh sentence). Yet mounting a defense is, for the accused, merely the exercise of a permission (as witnessed by the fact that he is entitled, at any point, to change his mind and enter a guilty plea). For any attorney that he employs, on the other hand, the exercise of this permission generates an obligation to mount that defense.
Thus, from the standpoint of business ethics, if it can be shown that shareholders are merely permitted to claim the residual earnings of the fi rm, and that managers are their agents, it then follows that managers are obliged to serve them loyally in this regard. This is morally salient, because the relationship creates that moral obligation, by transforming a permission into an obligation. It also means, inter alia, that agents will be forbidden to do certain things that are permissible for principals. The nemo dat principle is misleading in this regard. When it comes to obligations, principals do in fact 'give' that which they do not have. Thus Goodpaster's observation, with respect to the impossibility of creating permissions, does not undermine the signifi cance of agency analysis. Relationships between individuals-particularly fi duciary relationships-are not merely a distraction; they represent a genuine source of moral obligation.
It is important to note that the shareholder's claim on residual earnings need not be "good" in order to generate an obligation on the part of the manager to maximize it. Critics of the "loyalty" argument often appeal to the intuition that the desire on the part of shareholders to "make as much money as possible" (as Friedman put it) is somehow morally dubious. But one need not show that there is anything laudable about the desire for profi t in order to demonstrate the importance of agency analysis-one need only demonstrate that profi t is morally permissible. This is a much lighter burden of proof, a fact that is sometimes obscured by theorists like Newton, who use abstract terms of condemnation such as "greed" to describe the motives of shareholders. Certain actions may not be morally praiseworthy, but they are not, by virtue of that fact, morally impermissible, and as long as they are permissible they may in turn become obligatory for others.
Thus the normative critique of the agency perspective is based upon a set of conceptual confusions. There does seem to be something wrong with the idea that managers might be morally obliged to maximize the profi ts of shareholders (or act as "agents for the greedy"). It sounds wrong when one fi rst hears it. But upon closer examination, it turns out to be perfectly defensible, so long as one can show that it is permissible for individuals to seek a return on their savings, and that managers owe some sort of loyalty to the shareholders of the fi rm.
WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?
The preceeding discussion has surveyed three potential problems with agency theory, from the perspective of the business ethicist: fi rst, that it treats all motivation as self-interested; second, that it pressupposes shareholder primacy; and third, that it encourages violation of the nemo dat principle (and thus, evasion of moral responsibility). We have seen, however, that the identifi cation of rational choice theory with self-interest is something of an oversimplifi cation (agency theory leads us to expect opportunism on the part of individuals, but not necessarily self-interest); that agency theory is not committed to the doctrine of shareholder primacy; and fi nally, that the nemo dat principle, correctly understood, does not diminish the moral signifi cance of agency relationships.
Thus the only really important issue outstanding is the fi rst one, having to do with opportunism. How important is it that agency theory downplays the signifi cance of social norms, moral principles, and "intrinsic" motives in explaining human conduct? The standard defense of the agency theorist will be to say that this is all just positive theory, no one is recommending universal opportunism. As an empirical tool for understanding the way organizations function and for explaining various aspects of organizational structure, agency theory has proven its value.Why should that be of concern? Thus the central question for the ethicist becomes: If agency theory is merely a tool used to develop a positive theory of the fi rm, how much mischief could it really cause in a corporate environment? The answer is: Quite a lot.
The fi rst step to understanding this answer lies in an appreciation of the fact that, because it is based upon a fl awed conception of human rationality, agency theory generates predictions that are wildly at variance with what one can actually observe in the behavior of individuals and in the structure of organizations. In other words, it generates a positive theory that, insofar as it is falsifi able, is demonstrably false. Of course, many of the potential problems identifi ed by agency theory are no doubt genuine-this is why the theory resonates with so many people. There is, for example, a notable tendency toward moral hazard. Similarly, individuals have a tendency to act non-cooperatively in collective action problems. Usually, however, these show up only as tendencies, even when game-theoretic analysis predicts universal defection. In particular, while moral hazard in the fi rm can be a serious problem, empirically it is much less of a problem than any straightforward application of game-theoretic analysis to principal-agent relations would lead one to predict. For example, while employees do sometimes shirk-everyone knows that-most of the time they shirk a lot less than they could, as a matter of fact, get away with.
The empirical limitations of game-theoretic models have, of course, been exhaustively studied and documented by experimental game theorists. It is well-known, for instance, that large numbers of individuals cooperate in one-shot prisoners' dilemmas, knowing full well that there is no possibility of reciprocation. This fairly large-scale deviation from the equilibrium strategy is not a "blip" or an artifact of some particular experimental procedure-cooperation remains stable under a wide variety of conditions: across a wide range of different cultures, among subjects playing for the fi rst time and among those with previous experience, in large and small groups, and with a variety of different monetary rewards (Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Isaac, McCue, & Plott, 1985; Kim & Walker, 1984; Schneider & Pommerehne, 1981) .
Apart from the prisoner's dilemma, the other game that has been widely studied in experimental settings is the "ultimatum game." Here, one player is given a fi xed sum of money and told to propose some division of the money between himself and one other person. The second player can then either accept this proposal, in which case the money is divided up as per the offer, or reject the proposal, in which case both players receive nothing. Of course, the second player never has any positive incentive to reject any offer, since no proposed division is worse than receiving nothing. Thus rejecting the offer is a punitive action-and the threat to do so is precisely the sort of commitment that sequential rationality rules out. As a result, standard game theory suggests that the proposer should select a division that gives the second player as little as possible (in a sense, behaving opportunistically), and that this proposal should always be accepted. In reality, not only do players tend to offer much more than the instrumental analysis predicts, but proposals also tend to be rejected if they fall too low. In industrialized societies, mean offers tend to be around 44 percent, while offers below 20 percent are rejected 40 to 60 percent of the time. Experimental evidence from non-industrialized societies refl ects greater variability-including examples of mean offer rates above 50 percent, combined with frequent rejection of such offers. Yet in spite of these variations, no experiment has ever come close to conforming to the expectations of standard game theory (see Henrich et al., 2001) .
Given these experimental fi ndings, it would not be surprising to fi nd that agency theory consistently overstates the agency costs that may arise within organizations, simply because real human beings often behave cooperatively, exhibit loyalty, and refrain from acting opportunistically, even in the absence of external incentives. This fact is of course well-understood by sophisticated management theorists, even those deeply wedded to the agency perspective. The general upshot of a lot of agency analysis of the fi rm is that many organizations, especially those that exhibit what Williamson calls "information impactedness" (1973: 318), simply would not function if the only tools that managers had at their disposal were external punishments and rewards. Bengt Holström (1982) showed very early on how imperfect observability could make it impossible to devise effi cient incentive schemes for individuals working in teams. George Baker (1992) and others drew attention to the fact that, when effort or output was not fully observable, a system of sharp incentives focused upon one aspect of the task could produce results that were much worse than a system of dull incentives applied to the task as a whole. Much of the agency literature wound up sounding a very skeptical note on the subject of performance pay, and provided unexpected support for the old-fashioned practice of paying employees a fl at salary (Gibbons, 1998) . Results such as these suggested that, insofar as real-world corpora-tions do actually succeed in extracting reasonable levels of cooperative effort from their employees, there must be more than just external incentives at work.
Given these results, one might wonder where the harm could be in business schools teaching agency theory, or in managers using it as an analytic tool. And perhaps there would be no problem, except for the fact that the limitations of the theory are often overlooked or understated. This can lead to mischief in several different ways:
Imputed Incentives
People who are overly impressed by economic methodology often subscribe to the instrumental conception of rationality in a form that makes the model essentially unfalsifi able. As a result, when particular agency problems do not show up where agency theory predicts that they should, rather than concluding that there must be some relevant internal motive of deontic constraint at work, these theorists assume that the external incentive must be there, but that it simply has not been discovered yet. Economists have in fact invested extraordinary ingenuity and effort in the task of devising baroque external incentive schemes as a way of explaining phenomena that in fact admit of far more straightforward "internal" explanations. To take just one example, there are two prominent interpretations of the so-called "effi ciency wage" phenomenon. Henry Ford set the relevant precedent, by voluntarily increasing the pay of his workers to $5 a day at a time when average wages in the automobile industry were less than half that. He was rewarded with a signifi cant increase in worker productivity (so much so that he later described it as "one of the fi nest costcutting moves we ever made" [Ford, 1922: 147] ). The common sense explanation would be to suppose that Ford tapped into an underlying norm of reciprocity (see Akerloff, 1982; Fehr, Gächtner, & Kirchsteiger, 1996) . According to this perspective, the notion of a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay" plays a powerful role in determining employee effort levels (Hausman & McPherson, 1996: 55-56) . So when the "boss" agrees to pay you a rate that is, by common admission, far in excess of what he is obliged to pay, he has in essence done you a favor. And since "one good turn deserves another," you then owe it to him to put more effort into your work (or at very least, to refrain from shirking). One might also expect this obligation to be enforced informally in the relations between workers on the shop fl oor, thus removing an important barrier to observability and leading to a dramatic reduction in moral hazard problems.
It should also be noted that, apart from its common sense appeal, signifi cant empirical evidence supports this "norm of reciprocity" explanation of effi ciency wages (Gneezy, 2003) . Nevertheless, many economists have felt the need to resist this explanation. The more popular suggestion has been that, by paying workers an above-market wage rate, Ford essentially created an economic rent associated with employment at his fi rm. This made workers more averse to losing their jobs, by making it unlikely that they would fi nd work at comparable wages elsewhere. This, combined with the queues of workers that began to assemble outside Ford's factory looking for work, created enough fear of dismissal to motivate the existing workers to shirk less (Fraser & Waschik, 2002: 291) . According to this view, the effi ciency effects of the wage increase can be explained entirely through reference to traditional monetary incentives, and without appeal to any obscure "internal" motivational factors, such as a sense of fairness or a commitment to reciprocity. (Of course, few people would doubt that the "external" explanation represents a part of the story, perhaps even an important part. The question is whether it represents the entire story.) John Boatright has argued that this methodologically induced bias toward explanations in terms of external incentives can have a psychological "framing effect" that, when translated into practical managerial decision-making, "might result in mistaken solutions to problems or even incorrect assessments of the problems to be solved" (1999: 48; see also Dees, 1992: 35) . For example, the agency perspective "is apt to lead to a distrust of agents and a reliance on mechanisms of control. Such an approach is warranted in certain situations, but when applied in a business setting it may result in an overinvestment in monitoring and other contractual solutions and a corresponding underinvestment in building trust in an organization, and in fostering traits like loyalty and professionalism" (Boatright, 1999: 49; see also Frey & Osterloh, 2002) .
The more important problem, however, arises as a consequence of the assumption that, whenever a particular sort of agency cost fails to arise, there must always be an explanation in terms of external incentives. This can encourage individuals in such "agent" positions to act in a purely instrumental fashion, by leading them to assume that there must already be a system of checks and balances in place to mitigate the negative impact of any opportunistic actions that they take, even if they cannot see it. If they believed, on the other hand, that the situation called for moral restraint on their part, as the only way of avoiding an agency cost or a collective action problem, then they might be less willing to act opportunistically or non-cooperatively. They would certainly be deprived of one powerful rationalization for unethical conduct.
For example, many agency theorists downplay the signifi cance of the "fi duciary" relationship that exists between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . A fi duciary relationship implies both a "duty of care" and a "duty of loyalty," both concepts that are unintelligible as such within a game-theoretic framework. Thus agency theorists tend to resist taking these obligations at face value, instead choosing to regard them as just legal "shorthand" for a certain set of implicit contracts, ones that are ultimately structured by external incentives. 7 But such an analysis can easily lead those who are in a fi duciary role to take these obligations less seriously, and to act in a more opportunistic fashion, on the grounds that these implicit contracts already anticipate such forms of behavior. When combined with the so-called "effi cient markets" hypothesis, which dramatically underplays the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, the result can be a very straightforward rationalization of unethical conduct.
Robert Clark describes the basis of this rationalization as a "facile optimism about the optimality of existing institutions " (1985: 65) . For example, it is common among those who share the "implicit contracts" perspective to regard management "nest-feathering," not as a breach of fi duciary duty, but merely as implicit compensa-tion. Managerial misrepresentation of company accounts (i.e., "loose" accounting standards) is sometimes defended, and opportunistic behavior is excused, on the grounds that it must have already been "implicitly" accounted for. Consider the following argument, made by Lawrence Revsine:
It is reasonable to presume that those who negotiate managers' employment contracts anticipate such opportunistic behavior and reduce the compensation package accordingly. Notice that the demand for "loose" standards is further increased insofar as managers bear some or all of the agency costs. Since they have already been "charged" for the anticipated opportunistic actions, they must now engage in them in order to achieve the benefi ts they "paid" for. Since loose standards facilitate opportunistic actions, the demand for such standards increases. (Revsine 1991: 18) Here the "facile optimism" about effi cient contracting is presented, not just in a way that excuses breaches of fi duciary duty, but in a way that actually puts pressure on managers to violate these duties. After all, if a manager has already been "charged" for padding an expense account, in the form of reduced compensation, then he or she would be a fool to refrain from padding it. More generally, any manager who does not take advantage of any and all "opportunities for opportunism" is essentially being suckered.
From an ethical perspective, the impact that such reasoning can have should not be underestimated. The idea that ill-gotten gains are merely implicit compensation is one of the most important "techniques of neutralization" used by white-collar criminals to rationalize-and hence to grant themselves permission to engage inillegal conduct (Coleman, 1987: 414) . Thus one can see in Revsine's argument a clear example of how a false understanding of agency theory and its implications can serve as a powerful impetus toward both immoral and illegal behavior. Of course, there is a sense in which agency theory itself is not to be blamed. Nevertheless, this false understanding is extremely widespread, so the potential for mischief that it creates merits emphasis.
Crowding Out of Moral Incentives
As we have seen, the methodological biases of agency theory generate an overemphasis on external incentives as a way of addressing agency risks, along with a comparative neglect of internal incentives. Thus an enormous amount of time and energy has been frittered away designing increasingly clever incentive schemes, to the neglect of more obvious strategies for securing employee loyalty and dedication. Yet while this may be a waste of time, one might also be inclined to think that it also can do no harm. Even if an organization depends heavily upon voluntary deontic constraint on the part of its employees in order to avoid certain potential agency problems, surely it can't hurt to layer on some additional external incentives, in order to create a greater alignment of interests?
Of course, the agency literature itself is full of cautionary examples of how incentive schemes can distort incentives, and thus of how poorly designed incentive schemes can exacerbate agency problems. Yet a more general problem has been almost entirely ignored, namely, that even a well-designed system of external incentives has the potential to undermine moral motivation, and thus to create agent costs where previously none existed (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) . This is something that was well-known to previous generations of organizational theorists (e.g., McGregor, 1960) , but has become so thoroughly sidelined by the rise of agency theory that serious experimental research has been required to reestablish the importance of the basic phenomenon (what is now referred to as the "crowding out" of moral incentives).
Research by Bruno Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997) has highlighted some of the ways in which pecuniary incentives can have the effect of undermining moral motivation. In one study, they examined the willingness of citizens to accept NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard") projects, such as nuclear waste disposal sites, in Switzerland. Nuclear power plants produce benefi ts that are enjoyed quite widely, but impose highly localized costs (such as the dangers associated with waste storage and disposal). This gives local communities an incentive to "free ride"-to use the electrical power, but then refuse to accept either generation or disposal facilities in their region. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee found that in one Swiss village that had been identifi ed by experts as the best disposal site, a slender majority of citizens (50.8 percent) were willing to accept the creation of such a facility in their community (and thus to act "cooperatively"). Yet surprisingly, when offi cials decided to sweeten the deal by offering an additional monetary payment as compensation (ranging from US$2,175 to $6,525), support for the project plummeted to 24.6 percent.
It is not diffi cult to imagine what went on. Based upon simple cost-benefi t calculation, it is very unlikely that any community would fi nd it in their interest to accept a nuclear waste disposal facility. The value of the power that they (along with everyone else) receive is simply not worth it, especially when there is a reasonable chance that concerted resistance to the project will result in its being located in some other community (i.e., that NIMBY free-riding is a feasible option). Thus monetary compensation is not likely to tip the balance for many people. The only way to get citizens to accept such a facility is through a moral appeal, which might lead them to overlook their self-interest in favor of the "greater good." When considering the project "from the moral point of view," citizens simply do not engage in the relevant cost-benefi t calculations. They approach the question from the standpoint of what John Rawls calls "the reasonable," rather than "the rational" (1993: 48-54) . Furthermore, their consent may be based upon the fact that they do not enter into these calculations. 8 Offering people external incentives has the effect of changing their perspective, so that they no longer consider the question from the moral point of view, but rather examine it from the standpoint of their self-interest (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) . If the external incentives are inadequate from this standpoint, then the incentive scheme may easily have the effect of undermining cooperation, thereby creating real collective action problems where previously there were only potential ones.
This phenomenon has been reproduced experimentally in various ways. James Heyman and Dan Ariely provide a particularly clear illustration (2004) . They asked students to perform a somewhat boring task (dragging around circles on a computer screen). One group was paid a fl at fee of $5 to participate in the experiment, another was paid a "piece rate" of 10 or 50 cents per circle dragged, and the fi nal group was simply asked to do it as a "favor." Those who were paid 50 cents per circle dragged more than those paid only 10 cents, as an economist would be inclined to predict. However, those who were paid the fl at rate of $5 dragged far more circles than those who were paid a piece rate, while those who were simply asked to do it as a favor dragged the most circles of all (Ariely 2008, 68-69) .
"Money," Ariely concludes, "is very often the most expensive way to motivate people" (2008, 84) . More importantly, what the experiment suggests is that internal and external incentives are not necessarily complementary or cumulative, even when in theory they are correctly "aligned" to promote the same outcome. In practice they may be mutually antagonistic (e.g., if one were to take the students who were dragging the circles as a favor and start offering them money, one might easily see a decline in performance). Furthermore, there is good reason to think that the type of incentive schemes often promoted by agency theorists for use within corporations have considerable potential to undermine moral motivation. Far from intensifying work effort, the external incentive scheme may simply communicate the message that management does not "trust" workers. One need only recall the way that workers have historically responded to sharp incentives such as piece rates, along with the monitoring systems that are required in order to implement them, to see the consequences this may have.
The general problem is that agency theory has a completely "top-down" focus when it comes to analyzing relationships within the fi rm. Sanctions fl ow from the principal, who occupies a higher rank in the organizational hierarchy, down toward the agent, who occupies a subordinate role. It is a purely unilateral and one-sided relationship (Blair 2000, 71-72) . Thus the "framing effect" of agency theory tends to encourage essentially Taylorian management practices. Nothing in the agency perspective, for instance, discourages the principal from acting opportunistically with respect to the agent, or even speaks to this problem (Dees 1992, 49) .
Moral relations, on the other hand, are based upon trust, and are therefore typically secured through some form of reciprocity. Managers cannot dictate that employees exhibit trust, they must work to cultivate it. The standard way of doing this is to exhibit loyalty and trustworthiness in one's own conduct (Ariely 2008, 79-80) . Thus moral incentives usually develop within relations that are mutual and two-sided. These can be extraordinary diffi cult to cultivate in an environment in which one party also has unilateral and arbitrary control over the power to punish and reward the other. Thus an organization that seeks to cultivate trust and loyalty will often go out of its way to downplay its hierarchical structure, along with the potential for unilateral action that this creates. The type of incentives schemes that tend to fl ow from an agency analysis, on the other hand, often create an "ethos" that is highly antagonistic to the development of strong bonds of solidarity. (One can see here the substance of Kulik's [2005] complaint that an overemphasis on performance pay, bonuses, and other "sharp incentives" at Enron created an "agency culture," that in turn eroded the basis for ethical conduct.)
Cryptonormativism
No matter how strenuously agency theorists may insist that theirs is only a "positive" theory of the fi rm, and thus entails no "value judgments," the fact remains that the basic approach has as its foundation a normative theory of practical rationality, one that categorizes certain forms of action as "rational" and certain other forms as "irrational." The fact that morality (or cooperation) gets consistently categorized within such models as irrational, and opportunism (or defection) as rational, might easily lead more impressionable minds to the conclusion that they should learn to ignore moral constraints (Miller, 1999) . This can have two pernicious consequences. First, in the interests of acting more "rationally," individuals may begin to plan their own behavior in accordance with the dictates of the instrumental model, and thus begin to act more opportunistically. Second, even if they do not change their own deliberative processes, they may begin to expect higher levels of opportunistic behavior from others, and therefore feel justifi ed in engaging in "preemptive" defection in order to protect themselves from the anticipated defection of others. Thus Ronald Duska observes that the instrumental conception of rationality has the potential to become a "self-fulfi lling prophecy." "If I think humans are always going to be selfi sh, and cannot help but be so, it becomes the height of foolishness to sacrifi ce myself, or to predict their behavior on any other than selfi sh grounds" (Duska, 1992: 149, see also Argyris. 1973: 264-66 ). Yet the type of "I did it to him to prevent him from doing it to me" reasoning that this generates provides another one of the classic techniques of neutralization used to excuse anti-social behavior (see Sykes & Matza, 1975: 668) .
There is some evidence to support this concern about instrumental rationality becoming a self-fulfi lling prophecy (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005) . It was widely reported, for instance, that one of the only signifi cant anomalies discovered in experimental trials of the "public goods" game in North America occurred when the game was played among economics graduate students. There the rate of cooperation fell to only 20 percent, whereas it remained over 40 percent when played by students in other disciplines (Marwell & Ames, 1981; also Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993) . In a series of follow-up questions, students were asked whether a concern over "fairness" played a role in their decisions. Whereas virtually all noneconomists answered yes, "more than one-third of the economists either refused to answer the question regarding what is fair, or gave very complex, uncodable responses. . . . Those who did respond were much more likely to say that little or no contribution was 'fair'. In addition, the economics graduate students were about half as likely as other subjects to indicate that they were 'concerned with fairness' in making their decisions" (Marwell & Ames, 1981, 309) . This is important because, contrary to the widespread conviction that the willingness to act morally is primarily dependent upon ethical character, which in turn is instilled through childhood socialization, empirical studies have generated strong support for the contention that the willingness to act morally is in fact highly situational, and that individuals rely to an exceptional degree upon social cues in their immediate environment in order to determine what to do (Doris, 2002) . Thus it would be no surprise to discover that a social environment in which the dominant assumption is that "it's every man for himself," is one that would not only encourage unethical behavior, but could become positively criminogenic.
AGENCY THEORY AS CRITICAL THEORY
The discussion so far has focused upon the mischief that can be caused by an overly literal use of agency theory as a tool for understanding the relations between individuals within a fi rm. The problems stem from the model of rational action underlying agency theory, which is not normatively neutral, but results rather in a selective emphasis upon the consequentialist dimension of practical rationality, while ignoring the role of deontic constraint. Thus the use of agency theory as the methodological foundation of a positive theory of the fi rm tends to produce a highly distorted image of how these organizations function, which can in turn have undesirable effects upon behavior if naively adopted as an accurate account of reality. This is, however, not the only way to use agency theory. There is a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, dating back most obviously to Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, that uses an instrumental model of rationality as the basis for the development of a normative theory (Heath, 1996) . Theorists working in this tradition, rather than asserting that individuals always act in a self-interested manner, instead merely pose the question, what if individuals always acted in a purely self-interested manner? The instrumental model is then used as a foundation for a dystopian "state of nature" thought-experiment, which characterizes the condition that society would be in if individuals failed to respect any "internal" or moral constraints in the way that they pursue their objectives. It is not diffi cult to show that, under such conditions, individuals would become embroiled in insuperable collective action problems. With a little more work (and pace Hobbes), it is possible to show that no system of purely external incentives can be created that will resolve these problems (Braybrooke, 1976) . Thus a general case can be made for the claim that individuals should adopt some form of internal constraint, as the best way of avoiding a life that is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."
In this tradition of thought, the instrumental conception of rationality is used to construct a cautionary tale. It allows one to state with a great degree of precision what would happen in the absence of morality and other systems of deontic constraint. Agency theory can be (and has been) used in exactly the same way. Thus many business ethicists have drawn upon its results-especially the limitative results, which show how ubiquitous moral hazard problems would be, and how diffi cult the design of effective incentive schemes would be, in the absence of moral constraint-in order to show that corporations could not even begin to function in the absence of signifi cant moral constraint on the part of employees or managers. Noreen (1988) has developed this insight into a powerful rebuttal of the standard "invisible hand" critique of business ethics, which claims that marketplace competition renders the constraints of morality otiose (Gauthier, 1982) . As Noreen puts it, "agency theory can be used to provide a series of instructive parables that illustrate the adverse consequences on social and economic systems of unconstrained opportunistic The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory behavior " (1988: 360) , and can therefore be used as a way of building the case for ethical conduct in business relations.
According to this perspective, individuals are capable of acting opportunistically, but are also capable of exhibiting restraint. The extent to which they do either is very much dependent upon circumstance, institutional context, and background culture. Agency theory offers a characterization of the dystopian extreme, in which opportunistic conduct is rampant. This provides not only a good reason for wanting to ensure that greater moral restraint is exercised (viz., to achieve a reduction in agency costs), it also provides a good explanation for the competitive advantage certain fi rms are able to derive from an organizational culture that promotes such restraint. Francis Fukuyama, for example, has developed this analysis as a way of explaining the competitive advantage that family-owned fi rms often enjoy in the incubation stage of corporate development (1995: 74-80) . The fact that family members are able to draw upon preexisting trust relations allows them avoid all sorts of contracting and agency costs that rival fi rms must incur. This explains why "social capital"-"the degree to which communities share norms and values and are able to subordinate individual interests to those of larger groups" (Fukuyama, 1995: 10; also Coleman, 1988) -is a form of capital. It is precisely because it can be drawn upon by individuals in order to avoid agency costs in their organizations, both by reducing agency losses directly and by reducing the need for costly monitoring.
A fi rm is not just a "privately owned market," as Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz misleadingly suggested (1972: 795) . It constitutes an institutional environment that is internally insulated from the competitive norms of the market, and is thereby made more conducive to the emergence of cooperative or high-trust norms. Alchian and Demsetz claim that "telling an employee to type this letter is like telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread " (1972: 777) . Of course, at a certain level of abstraction anything resembles anything else. This particular claim, however, is not only misleading, but perversely so, because it denies precisely the most important characteristic that distinguishes hierarchies from markets, viz., the fact that fi rms are able to cultivate internally a set of cooperative norms (including norms establishing obedience to authority) that are specifi cally suspended in market transactions.
A critical agency perspective is able to explain quite clearly why, as production becomes more knowledge-intensive, successful fi rms typically move away from external incentives and develop an interest in organizational culture, team-building and "shared values." It is because agency problems are caused, fundamentally, by information asymmetries. As production becomes more knowledge-intensive, the potential for such problems increases, the diffi culty of creating effective external incentives schemes is compounded, and the probability of such schemes "backfi ring" increases. Thus fi rms come to rely more and more upon internal incentives to secure the voluntary cooperation of their workers. This in turn requires treating them less like cogs, and more like partners in the production process. (In this respect, critical agency analysis vindicates several of the fundamental intuitions underlying Peter Drucker's analysis of management as a "liberal art" [2001: 3-13] ). Allen Buchanan has taken insight one step further, arguing that agency theory not only provides a good argument for business ethics in general, but that the analysis of agency risks provides the key to understanding many of the real-world moral codes that already (implicitly or explicitly) structure activities within bureaucratic organizations. His analysis "derives important features of the ethics of bureaucratic organizations from an understanding of what bureaucratic organizations are like, in particular, from an understanding of what kinds of agency-risks arise within them" (1996: 422). Agency theory tells us where the major stress lines lie within these organizations, where cracks are most likely to appear. The implicit ethical code of the organization is then analyzed as the glue that (to a greater or lesser degree of success) holds things together. Thus in Buchanan's view, agency analysis provides greater theoretical purchase upon these codes, helping business ethicists to gain a greater appreciation of their deep structure.
Buchanan proposes an ingenious analysis, in which he distinguishes between "fi rst-order" and "second-order" agency risks. The former refl ect the possibility of actions that impose costs upon the principal and benefi t the agent directly. The latter involve actions that impose costs upon the principal, yet benefi t the agent only indirectly, insofar as they make it more diffi cult for the principal to eliminate fi rst-order agency risks, and thus allow the agent to continue some course of action that is a source of direct benefi t. For example, while shirking would be a fi rst-order agency problem, employees may also take actions aimed at frustrating a monitoring system that has been instituted in order to control shirking. In effect, they act to preserve the information asymmetry that creates the fi rst-order moral hazard problem. Insofar as this is costly to the organization, it is a second-order agency problem. In this way, Buchanan is able to explain why individuals in bureaucratic organizations develop a moral allegiance, not just to meritocratic or "work ethic" principles, but also to procedures that ensure accountability, proper procedure and preservation of the "chain of command " (1996: 431) .
The agency perspective is similarly useful when it comes to analyzing the obligations of senior managers. While agency theory itself does not presuppose any commitment to the doctrine of shareholder primacy, agency analysis can be used to motivate the suggestion that, in a standard business corporation, managers should bear special fi duciary obligations towards shareholders (Marcoux, 2003) . Unlike other patron groups, whose interests are protected by contract, shareholders are residual claimants, with only formal control of the fi rm's board of directors as a mechanism for ensuring that their interests are respected. The potential agency costs are simply much greater in the relationship between management and the fi rm's owners than they are between the fi rm and its other constituency groups, whose interests are protected by explicit contracts (Boatright 2006: 113) . Thus the agency perspective is able to explain why courts essentially impose a fi duciary obligation upon senior managers to advance the interests of the owners of the fi rm (and why they limit the ability of the parties to "contract around" this obligation [Clark, 1985: 64] ). Agency analysis is also able to demonstrate quite clearly why conventional stock options proved so ineffective as a way of creating an external alignment of managerial and shareholder interests (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004: 137-40) , and it is able to show how the movement of the stock price, combined with the takeover threat, is an extremely blunt instrument for disciplining management (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuck, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Miller, 1992: 171-76 ). This in turn helps to make the case for the claim that moral restraint on the part of managersa genuine commitment to serving the shareholder-is an essential element in the proper functioning of the private enterprise system. When used in this way, far from being a contributing factor to the recent spate of corporate scandals, agency theory proves to be an invaluable tool in understanding what went wrong at these fi rms. After all, the frauds in question occurred at precisely the points that agency theory identifi es as central fault lines (Bebchuck & Fried, 2003) . To draw an analogy, consider what an agency analysis of the professional role of the doctor would look like. There is no question that doctors should exercise moral restraint in their dealings with colleagues, other medical professionals (nurses, technicians, etc.), patients, and their families. At the same time, an agency analysis is able to identify patients as the class of individuals who are uniquely vulnerable to exploitation in their relationship with the doctor (fi rst and foremost because of the information asymmetries that exist between the two). Thus the case can be made for a special fi duciary obligation on the part of the doctor toward the patient (in the same way that a case can be made for a fi duciary obligation between the manager and the owners of a fi rm). From this perspective, it would be unsurprising to discover that most of the internal disciplinary proceedings that occur within physician associations involve abuse of patients (and not, for example, colleagues). In the same way, it would be unsurprising to discover that the most common "ethics scandals" in the corporate world involved an abuse of shareholders by management.
Of course, it is important not to think that the moral codes of bureaucratic organizations serve no purpose other than the reduction of agency costs. Steen Thomsen is perhaps being overly optimistic when he describes the moral norms that arise within fi rms as simply another "governance mechanism," which can be appealed to "when alternative governance mechanisms (pure markets, hierarchies, government, the prevailing social ethic) fail to achieve a social optimum" (2001, 156) . This would imply a system of moral constraint containing purely "bottom-up" obligations, a structure that precisely tracked the organizational hierarchy of the fi rm. (The principles that Buchanan outlines, for instance, focus exclusively on what subordinates owe to their superiors. In part for this reason, Buchanan is at pains to emphasize that his is not a complete conception of business ethics.) An entirely "bottom up" moral code would be in tension with the usual system of reciprocity upon which moral obligations depend. As a result, while agency theory may serve a useful purpose in telling us where ethics is most needed within organizations, morality has its own logic, and so we may not be able to develop an ethics code that is tailored to resolve a precise set of agency problems. There will often be a quid pro quo, such that ethical conduct can only be elicited from the agent in one domain if the principal is willing to accept moral constraint in some other, where he or she might have preferred to exercise the freedom to act strategically.
In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the ability of a completely "intrinsic" set of motives to resolve agency problems can also be quite limited. In particular, while the presence of external sanctions can have the effect of undermining moral motivation, the absence of external sanctions can also have the effect of unraveling cooperation (as those who have acted cooperatively in the past become less willing to do so, when they see others defecting with impunity). Thus it is important, when applying the critical agency perspective, to keep in mind the limits and the instability of voluntary cooperative action. The sort of ethics codes typically recommended from the critical agency perspective will usually not be "incentive-compatible," yet that does not give the critical agency theorist license to ignore the incentives that agents face altogether, or to imagine that "ethics" is some sort of magic bullet for resolving agency problems. The fact that a particular institutional arrangement generates an agency problem in theory may not be a problem; but if it has been shown that the arrangement generates the problem in practice, and the parties seem resistant to moral suasion, then it is time to start thinking about legal and institutional remedies. Thus when doing applied ethics, it is important to keep in mind what Rawls called "the strains of commitment" (1999: 154-55) . A lot of problems would go away if people only behaved more ethically, but the fact is, people often don't behave all that ethically. Thus merely urging more ethical behavior upon them, beyond a certain point, no longer counts as offering a solution.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has examined two very different strategies for employing agency theory-the positive and the critical-and two very different sorts of objections that have been raised by business ethicists. The use of agency theory brings to the fore two sets of ideas that ethicists have traditionally been very uncomfortable with, fi rst, the economic model of rational action, and second, the doctrine of shareholder primacy and the obligation to maximize profi t. With regard to the fi rst, I have suggested that business ethicists have been at least partially justifi ed in their reservations. The economic model is based upon an inadequate conception of rational action, precisely because it classifi es an important category of moral action as irrational. Indeed, it classifi es all genuine rule-following as irrational, and is therefore unsuitable for use as a general theory of rational action. Sophisticated practitioners of agency theory are familiar with these limitations, but a large number of enthusiasts are not. Thus agency theory can serve as a source of considerable inadvertent mischief when treated as an accurate representation of reality. I have therefore encouraged a critical use of agency theory, in which principal-agent analysis is used to provide, not a model of how fi rms actually work, but rather a set of "instructive parables," allowing us to see more clearly what the world of business would be like in the absence of business ethics.
In this respect, the most important use of agency theory lies in its role in combating the widespread perception that business operates outside the sphere of moral evaluation and constraint. By operationalizing a certain form of moral skepticismone that denies that there are any genuine moral rules or deontic constraints-game theory in general, and agency theory in particular, shows what the consequences of generalized immorality would be. From this, we can extract both a normative and an empirical lesson: fi rst, that the consequences would be unappealing, insofar as it would lead to the collapse of many mutually benefi cial forms of cooperation; and second, that people are a lot more "moral"-even in the world of business-than we are sometimes inclined to believe. Agency theory allows us to see that in many cases, the alternative to ethical business enterprises is not the presence of unethical business enterprises, but rather the absence of any enterprise at all.
With regard to the doctrine of shareholder primacy, and the extent to which agency theory encourages this perspective, I have tried to emphasize that no simple connection exists between the two sets of ideas. Nevertheless, when employed cautiously, with due attention to the institutional context in which the fi rm operates, it is possible to use agency theory as the basis for a plausible shareholder-focused conception of business ethics. Agency theory can be used to show how the owners of a fi rm are in a uniquely vulnerable position with respect to the manager, and therefore why a fi duciary relation is justifi able in this case. So while a commitment to agency analysis neither presupposes nor entails a commitment to the doctrine of shareholder primacy, the gain in conceptual clarity afforded by the agency perspective does provide a powerful source of arguments in favor of that doctrine. This does not mean, however, that one could not use the agency framework to make the opposite claim, and it is certainly the case that many stakeholder theorists have sought to articulate and clarify their moral ideas using this framework.
NOTES

